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§ 611, cmt. c). The court found that this 
caveat did not apply to Dr. Rosenberg 
because there was nothing in the record 
to suggest that he intended in bad faith 
to harm Mr. Helinski by his testimony 
or the statements made to the news 
media. Dr. Rosenberg testified as an 
expert witness and his statements to the 
news media ~'accurately and fairly re-
counted the substance of his testi-
mony." Rosenberg, 328 Md. at 
686, 616 A.2d at 877. 
Rosenberg v. Helinski is significant 
because the Court of Appeals of Mary -
land addressed an issue which is certain 
to arise again; the right of the public to 
reports of judicial proceedings, and the 
legal privilege extended to those who 
make fair and accurate reports. 
-Bonnie S. Laakso 
Dawson v. State: ENFORCEMENT 
OF STATE'S DRUG-FREE 
SCHOOL ZONE ST ATUJE DUR-
ING NON-SCHOOL HOURS 
HELD CONSTITUTIONAL. 
In Dawson v. State, 329 Md. 275, 
619 A.2d 111 (1993), the Court of 
Appeals of Maryland upheld the consti-
tutionalityofthestate'sdrug-freeschool 
zone statute, which prohibits the distri-
bution of controlled dangerous sub-
stances within 1,000 feet ofa school's 
perimeter. After reviewing whether the 
statute's objective of protecting chil-
dren from the dangers ofthe drug trade 
is constitutionally achieved by the 
statute's broad imposition of criminal 
liability on offenders during non-school 
hours, the court found that the statute 
does not offend the due process require-
ments of either the United States Con-
stitution or the Maryland Constitution. 
During the course of an undercover 
drug operation in Harford County, 
county deputies purchased a quarter-
gram of cocaine from Stacey Eugene 
Dawson ("Dawson"). The transaction 
occurred within 1,000 feet of Halls 
Cross Elementary School, at approxi-
mately 9:30 p.m. After the sale, a 
uniformed officer returned to the scene 
and arrested Dawson. 
Dawson was indicted by the Grand 
Jury for Harford County for unlawful 
distribution of a controlled dangerous 
substance, under Md. Ann. Code art. 
27, § 286(a)(1)(1957, 1992 Repl. Vol.), 
and for unlawful distribution of a con-
trolled dangerous substance within 
1,000 feet of school property, under 
Md. Ann. Code art. 27, § 286D ("§ 
286D"). A jury in the Circuit Court for . 
Harford County found Dawson guilty 
on both counts. Dawson appealed to 
the Court of Special Appeals of Mary-
land, but prior to its review of the case, 
the Court of Appeals of Maryland 
granted certiorari. 
After first rejecting Dawson's con-
tention that the evidence was insuffi-
cient to convict him, the court focused 
on Dawson's argument that § 286D, 
Maryland's drug-free school zone stat-
ute, violated the equal protection clauses 
of both the United States Constitution 
and the Maryland Declaration of Rights. 
Dawson argued that the statute's objec-
tive of protecting children from expo-
sure to drug activities was not served by 
its imposition of criminal liability dur-
ing non-school hours. The court ex-
plained that Dawson was alleging a 
"direct" substantive due process chal-
lenge by claiming that the statute was 
not reasonably related to the goal it 
intended to serve and that in the face of 
such a claim, a determination must be 
made whether the statute ". bears a real 
and substantial relation to the public 
health, morals, safety, and welfare of 
the citizens of this state. '" Dawson, 
329Md. at283, 619 A.2dat 115 (quot-
ing Bowie Inn v. City of Bowie, 274 
Md. 230, 236, 335 A.2d 679, 683 
(1975». If this test is satisfied, the 
statute will be upheld. 
In applying this test to § 286D, the 
court first examined the statutory lan-
guage and found that the statute was 
aimed at decreasing schoolchildren's 
drug use and enriching their educa-
tional environment by creating a drug-
free school zone. Dawson, 329 Md. at 
285,619 A.2d at 116. In addition, the 
court determined that the statute sought 
to limit schoolchildren's exposure to 
the negative environment and crime 
associated with the drug trade by shield-
ing them from such activity. Id. In light 
of these purposes, the court rejected 
Dawson's substantive due process chal-
lenge and found that a twenty-four hour 
prohibition against drug activity in 
school zones was a legitimate method of 
accomplishing the statute's purposes. 
Id. 
The court next considered Dawson's 
argument that the drug-free school zone 
statute was overbroad due to its impo-
sition of criminal liability during non-
school hours. Dawson, 329 Md. at286, 
619 A.2d at 116. The court, however, 
rejected Dawson's characterization of 
both school ground activities and the 
drug market, and found that the pres-
ence of children in school areas is not 
predictable, particularly in light of the 
23.3/U. BaIt. L.F. - 31 
extracurricular, community, and social 
activities which occur at or near schools. 
ld. Therefore, the court noted that 
children often may be present in school 
areas during non-school hours. ld. In 
addition, the court emphasized that the 
statute was not aimed at regulating the 
hou rs of dntg marketplaces, but instead 
at deterring such activity within school 
zones entirely. ld. The court reasoned 
that preventing a school zone from be-
coming known as a drug market would 
reduce children's exposure to drug ac-
tivities by discouraging the presence of 
persons involved in drug activities and 
reducing the litter of drug parapherna-
lia. ld. Furthermore, the court recog-
nized that one of the purposes behind 
the statute was to make the risks asso-
ciated with drug activity within a school 
zone outweigh the potential for drug 
profits. Dawson, 329 Md. at 286,619 
A.2d at 116-117. Thus, the court con-
cluded that the statute was a reasonable 
and rational method of achieving the 
state's goals, and accordingly, was con-
stitutional. Dawson, 329 Md. at 287, 
619 A.2d at 117. 
The court completed its analysis by 
comparing Maryland's drug-free school 
zone statute with its federal counter-
part, 21 U.S.c. § 845a, and with simi-
lar statutes in other states. The court 
noted that allegations similar to those 
32 - U. Bait. L.F.l23.3 
made by Dawson have been rejected in 
federal courts on the ground that the 
objective of the federal drug-free school 
zone statute could not be achieved by 
allowing dntg activity during non-school 
hours. Dawson, 329 Md. at 288, 619 
A.2d at 117-18 (quoting United States 
v. Crew, 916 F.2d 980, 983 (5th Cir. 
1990». In addition, the court empha-
sized that its holding was in accord with 
all other states which have reviewed the 
constitutionality Qf similar statutes. 
Dawson, 329 Md. at 288-89, 619 A.2d 
at 118. 
In Dawson v. Maryland, the Court 
of Appeals of Maryland held that 
Maryland's drug-free school zone stat-
ute does not violate the equal protection 
or due process clauses of either the 
United States Constitution or the Mary-
land Constitution. In so holding, the 
court took a positive step in fighting the 
drug war which plagues this country by 
recognizing that Maryland's drug-free 
school zone statute legitimately func-
tions to protect children from the evils 
of the drug trade. The court's decision 
has placed Maryland in accord with 
both federal and nationwide state law, 
and therefore, has created a more uni-
fied front in fighting the war on drugs. 
-Kimberly A. Kelly 
Patrick v. State: RESUL TS OF 
POLYGRAPH TESTS ARE DIS-
COVERABLE AS "SCIENTIFIC 
TESTS." 
In Patrick v. State, 329 Md. 24, 
617 A.2d 215 (1992) the Court of Ap-
peals of Maryland held that non-excul-
patory polygraph test results of poten-
tial witnesses qualified as "scientific 
tests" within the meaning of Maryland 
Rule 4-263(b)(4), and were therefore 
discoverable by a defendant upon re-
quest. Though this holding has no 
effect upon the admissibility of poly-
graph test results as evidence at trial, it 
makes them available to the defendant 
as an investigatory aid for the purpose 
of preparing his defense. 
Delmar William Patrick, III 
("Patrick") was charged with the mur-
der and attempted rape of a thirteen 
year old girl whose body was found in a 
wooded area near his home. Originally, 
Patrick denied any involvement in the 
crime, stating that had he found the 
girl's body but had been afraid to tell 
anyone. Subsequently, he provided 
various conflicting admissions and ac-
counts. During the investigation, po-
lice experts for the State conducted 
polygraph tests of several potential wit-
nesses. Patrick sought discovery of 
these test results including the ques-
tions asked, the responses given, and 
the tracings made by the polygraph 
machine. The State, however, refused 
to comply with his pretrial discovery 
motions. 
At trial, Patrick renewed his efforts 
to obtain the polygraph test results and 
informed the court of the State's failure 
to cooperate. Patrick argued that he 
was entitled to this information under 
Maryland Rule 4-263 (b)(4) even though 
the materials were not admissible in 
evidence. The relevant portions of this 
criminal discovery ntle provides for the 
disclosure of reports, including the re-
sults of any scientific test, made in 
connection with experts consulted by 
the State, upon the defendant's request. 
The Circuit Court for Cecil County 
denied Patrick's motion to compel dis-
